Online Appendix for
"How Do Voters Perceive Changes to the Rules of the Game? Evidence from the 2014 Hungarian Elections"

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A   Survey questions

A.1   Heterogenous effects variables

Education "What is your highest educational attainment?," which has 8 categories. We map responses 1-4 into "no secondary secondary"; 5-6 into "secondary degree"; and 7-8 map into "university degree."

Efficacy "To what extent do you agree or disagree that sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on?," which has 5 categories (Strongly agree (1), agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly agree (5)). We recode these to have 3 categories: -1 (agree or strongly agree), 0 (neutral), and 1 (disagree or strongly disagree).

Support for Fidesz "Which party list would you vote for if you were to vote?" We will recode this into two categories: 1 (Fidesz-KDNP) vs all other categories including "definitely do not vote."

A.2   Other covariates

Age This is calculated from the question reading, "Which year were you born in?"

Gender Female or male

Income "Please mark which of these categories your total net monthly household income falls into." This has 9 categories ranging from "20,000 HUF or less" to "more than 500,000 HUF." We assign each respondent the mean value of the bounds of the bucket s/he selected.

Region Responses are in {Central, East, West}.

Intent to turnout "What are your plans for the elections in April?" The responses "definitely do not vote" and "probably do not vote" coded as 0, and the responses "probably vote" and "definitely vote" coded as 1.

B   Survey samples

Table 1: Marginal Distributions for Survey Samples and 2011 Hungarian Census Population Proportions

	Pre-election Wave ($n = 3000$)	Post-election Wave ($n = 1500$)	Census Population Proportion
Gender:			
Male	47%	47%	46.7%
Female	53%	53%	53.3%
Age Categories:			
18–34	29%	27%	29.3%
35–44	18%	20%	18.2%
45–66	32%	33%	32.1%
65 or older	21%	20%	20.4%
Settlement type:			
Budapest	20%	20%	20%
Countryside	80%	80%	80%
Region:			
Central	30%	30%	30%
Eastern	39%	39%	39%
Western	31%	31%	31%

Table 2: Survey participation rates

	Pre-election Wave	Post-election Wave
email invitations	73763	2540
email reminders	NA	1357
clicked on the survey link	4400	1961
survey start rate	6%	50%
completed surveys	3000	1500
participation rate (%)	68%	76%

C Heterogenerous Treatment Effects

Table 3: OLS regression for perceived effect of Hungarian electoral reforms on the legitmacy of the 2014 election, pre-election survey. Heterogeneous effects by education and efficacy.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Info	−0.06	−0.08	0.54*	0.48*	−0.06	−0.07	0.002	−0.002
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.108)	(0.108)
× secondary			−0.73*	−0.69*				
			(0.18)	(0.18)				
× university			−0.68*	−0.62*				
			(0.18)	(0.18)				
× low efficacy							−0.07	−0.09
							(0.14)	(0.14)
× high efficacy							−0.11	−0.11
							(0.15)	(0.15)
Info+Partisan Cue	−0.17*	−0.19*	−0.09	−0.11	−0.18*	−0.19*	−0.28*	−0.28*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.16)	(0.15)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.11)
× secondary			−0.11	−0.11				
			(0.18)	(0.18)				
× university			−0.07	−0.07				
			(0.18)	(0.18)				
× low efficacy							0.08	0.07
							(0.14)	(0.14)
× high efficacy							0.22	0.20
							(0.15)	(0.15)
Secondary degree	−0.22*	−0.26*	0.07	0.01				
	(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.13)	(0.13)				
University degree	−0.37*	−0.37*	−0.11	−0.14				
	(0.07)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.13)				
Low efficacy					0.02	0.00	0.02	0.01
					(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.10)	(0.10)
High efficacy					−0.50*	−0.43*	−0.53*	−0.45*
					(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
adj. R^2	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.04	0.03	0.05	0.03	0.05

Omitted category is no secondary school in Models 1-4 and medium efficacy for Models 5-8. $n = 3000$.

Standard errors in parentheses. Intercept estimated but not reported.

Covariates are age and its square, gender, income, region, and turnout intention

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$ (one-tailed test)

Table 4: OLS regression for perceived effect of Hungarian electoral reforms on the legitmacy of the 2014 election, post-election survey. Heterogeneous effects by education and efficacy.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Info	−0.09	−0.09	0.25	0.25	−0.09	−0.09	−0.20	−0.19
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.15)
× secondary			−0.44	−0.44*				
			(0.27)	(0.27)				
× university			−0.34	−0.33				
			(0.27)	(0.27)				
× low efficacy							0.21	0.22
							(0.21)	(0.21)
× high efficacy							0.08	0.05
							(0.21)	(0.21)
Info+Party	−0.21*	−0.21*	−0.12	−0.10	−0.22*	−0.22*	−0.39*	−0.37*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.15)
× secondary			−0.05	−0.07				
			(0.27)	(0.27)				
× university			−0.16	−0.17				
			(0.27)	(0.27)				
× low efficacy							0.27	0.25
							(0.20)	(0.20)
× high efficacy							0.19	0.16
							(0.21)	(0.21)
Secondary degree	−0.18	−0.19*	−0.02	−0.02				
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.19)				
University degree	−0.27*	−0.27*	−0.11	−0.11				
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.19)				
Low efficacy					0.04	0.03	−0.12	−0.12
					(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.15)
High efficacy					−0.46*	−0.45*	−0.55*	−0.52*
					(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
adj. R^2	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.01	0.03	0.03	0.03	0.03

Omitted category is no secondary school in Models 1-4 and medium efficacy for Models 5-8. $n = 1500$.

Standard errors in parentheses. Intercept estimated but not reported.

Covariates are age and its square, gender, income, region, and turnout intention

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$ (one-tailed test)

D Alternative Models

Table 5: Comparing pre-election wave-only ($n = 1500$) and both-wave ($n = 1500$) samples: standardized differences in means with z-scores.

	std.diff	z	
Fidesz	-0.09	-2.57	*
Secondary degree	-0.13	-3.65	***
University degree	0.11	3.04	**
Efficacy: Low	0.06	1.53	
Efficacy: High	-0.04	-1.16	
Age	0.08	2.31	*
Female	0.00	0.00	
Income	0.16	4.32	***
Central Hungary	-0.01	-0.28	
Eastern Hungary	-0.01	-0.22	
Western Hungary	0.02	0.51	
Planned turnout	-0.01	-0.26	
LSQ23: "I am religious, I follow the teachings of the church"	0.03	0.79	
LSQ23: "I am religious in my own way"	-0.03	-0.81	
LSQ23: "I can't say if I was religious or not"	-0.08	-2.17	*
LSQ23: "I am not religious"	0.03	0.86	
LSQ23: "I have a different conviction, I am definitely not religious"	0.03	0.91	
2010 election: DNV	-0.07	-1.83	.
2010 election: Fidesz	-0.05	-1.47	
2010 election: Other	0.10	2.71	**

Table 6: OLS regression for perceived effect of Hungarian electoral reforms on the legitmacy of the 2014 election, pre-election survey using only respondents who participated in both survey waves.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Info	−0.07	−0.07	−0.09	−0.09	−0.42*	−0.39*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.23)	(0.23)
× non-supporter					0.38	0.34
					(0.24)	(0.24)
× convert					0.36	0.37
					(0.35)	(0.34)
× partisan					0.33	0.30
					(0.27)	(0.26)
Info+Partisan Cue	−0.15*	−0.16*	−0.14*	−0.16*	−0.38*	−0.39*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.07)	(0.06)	(0.23)	(0.22)
× non-supporter					0.22	0.21
					(0.24)	(0.24)
× convert					0.44	0.47
					(0.37)	(0.36)
× partisan					0.36	0.35
					(0.27)	(0.26)
Fidesz non-supporter			−0.73*	−0.72*	−0.92*	−0.88*
			(0.10)	(0.10)	(0.16)	(0.16)
Fidesz convert			0.85*	0.77*	0.60*	0.51*
			(0.14)	(0.14)	(0.25)	(0.25)
Fidesz partisan			1.25*	1.32*	1.04*	1.12*
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
adj. R^2	0.00	0.02	0.39	0.42	0.39	0.42

Omitted category is Fidesz defector. $n = 1500$.

Standard errors in parentheses. Intercept estimated but not reported.

Covariates are age and its square, gender, income, region, and turnout intention

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$ (one-tailed test)

Table 7: OLS regression for perceived effect of Hungarian electoral reforms on the legitmacy of the 2014 election, pre-election survey using only respondents who participated in both survey waves. Heterogeneous effects by education and efficacy.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Info	−0.06	−0.07	0.38	0.35	−0.07	−0.07	−0.23	−0.23
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.15)
× secondary			−0.58*	−0.54*				
			(0.27)	(0.27)				
× university			−0.44	−0.40				
			(0.27)	(0.27)				
× low efficacy							0.26	0.28
							(0.20)	(0.20)
× high efficacy							0.18	0.16
							(0.21)	(0.21)
Info+Partisan Cue	−0.14*	−0.16*	−0.15	−0.17	−0.17*	−0.17*	−0.43*	−0.43*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.15)	(0.15)
× secondary			−0.02	−0.01				
			(0.27)	(0.26)				
× university			0.03	0.05				
			(0.27)	(0.27)				
× low efficacy							0.38*	0.38*
							(0.20)	(0.20)
× high efficacy							0.35	0.34
							(0.21)	(0.21)
Secondary degree	−0.10	−0.13	0.09	0.05				
	(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.19)				
University degree	−0.26*	−0.26*	−0.13	−0.14				
	(0.11)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.19)				
Low efficacy					0.06	0.04	−0.16	−0.18
					(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.14)
High efficacy					−0.53*	−0.47*	−0.71*	−0.64*
					(0.09)	(0.09)	(0.15)	(0.15)
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
adj. R^2	0.00	0.03	0.01	0.03	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.05

Omitted category is no secondary school in Models 1-4 and medium efficacy for Models 5-8. $n = 1500$.

Standard errors in parentheses. Intercept estimated but not reported.

Covariates are age and its square, gender, income, region, and turnout intention

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$ (one-tailed test)

Our pre-analysis plan specified differences-in-means and OLS regression as our primary analysis framework. Our response variable, however, is ordered and categorical in nature and some have asked that we also report results using a model that makes more appropriate distributional assumptions. In Table 8 we re-fit models 1-6 from Table 1 in the main text and models 1-8 from Table 4 in the appendix using ordered logistic regression. Note that in these models we omit the quadratic age terms; age and age^2 were sufficiently collinear that it caused computational problems inverting the Hessian matrix.

Table 8: Ordered logistic regression for perceived effect of Hungarian electoral reforms on the legitmacy of the 2014 election, pre-election survey

	(OL1)	(OL2)	(OL3)	(OL4)
Info	−0.09	−0.12	−0.53*	−0.58*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.28)	(0.28)
× non-supporter			0.53*	0.54*
			(0.30)	(0.30)
× convert			0.83*	0.85*
			(0.39)	(0.40)
× partisan			0.43	0.51
			(0.32)	(0.33)
Info+Partisan Cue	−0.26*	−0.29*	−0.68*	−0.76*
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.28)	(0.28)
× non-supporter			0.40	0.43
			(0.30)	(0.30)
× convert			0.95*	1.07*
			(0.41)	(0.41)
× partisan			0.64*	0.67*
			(0.33)	(0.33)
Fidesz non-supporter			−1.24*	−1.26*
			(0.21)	(0.21)
Fidesz convert			0.88*	0.74*
			(0.28)	(0.28)
Fidesz partisan			1.75*	1.87*
			(0.23)	(0.23)
Age		−0.02*		−0.02*
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Female		0.25*		0.19*
		(0.07)		(0.07)
Income		−0.0001		−0.001*
		(0.0003)		(0.0003)
East		0.29*		0.23*
		(0.08)		(0.09)
West		0.30*		0.19*
		(0.09)		(0.09)
Turnout		0.02		−0.43*
		(0.11)		(0.12)
-2|-1	−0.73*	−1.17*	−1.32*	−2.64*
	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.28)
-1|0	−0.08	−0.49*	−0.45*	−1.71*
	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.27)
0|1	0.98*	0.60*	1.09*	−0.14
	(0.06)	(0.18)	(0.20)	(0.27)
1|2	2.22*	1.85*	2.67*	1.45*
	(0.08)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.28)
n	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000

Omitted category is Fidesz defector.

Table 9: Ordered logistic regression for perceived effect of Hungarian electoral reforms on the legitmacy of the 2014 election, pre-election survey. Heterogeneous effects by education and efficacy.

	(OL1)	(OL2)	(OL3)	(OL4)
Info	0.68*	0.58*	−0.001	−0.01
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.14)	(0.14)
× secondary	−0.94*	−0.88*		
	(0.24)	(0.24)		
× university	−0.86*	−0.74*		
	(0.24)	(0.24)		
× low efficacy			−0.10	−0.12
			(0.19)	(0.19)
× high efficacy			−0.15	−0.16
			(0.21)	(0.21)
Info+Partisan Cue	−0.15	−0.19	−0.38*	−0.39*
	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.15)	(0.15)
× secondary	−0.16	−0.16		
	(0.24)	(0.24)		
× university	−0.08	−0.06		
	(0.24)	(0.24)		
× low efficacy			0.10	0.09
			(0.19)	(0.19)
× high efficacy			0.28	0.24
			(0.21)	(0.21)
Secondary degree	0.09	−0.004		
	(0.17)	(0.17)		
University degree	−0.19	−0.25		
	(0.17)	(0.18)		
Low efficacy			0.04	0.01
			(0.13)	(0.14)
High efficacy			−0.80*	−0.69*
			(0.15)	(0.15)
Age		−0.02*		−0.01*
		(0.002)		(0.002)
Female		0.28*		0.18*
		(0.07)		(0.07)
Income		0.0003		0.0001
		(0.0003)		(0.0003)
East		0.27*		0.25*
		(0.08)		(0.08)
West		0.25*		0.27*
		(0.09)		(0.09)
Turnout		0.04		0.04
		(0.11)		(0.11)
-2|-1	−0.78*	−1.16*	−0.98*	−1.27*
	(0.15)	(0.23)	(0.10)	(0.21)
-1|0	−0.11	−0.47*	−0.30*	−0.57*
	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.10)	(0.21)
0|1	0.96*	0.63*	0.79*	0.53*
	(0.15)	(0.22)	(0.10)	(0.21)
1|2	2.21*	1.89*	2.05*	1.79*
	(0.16)	(0.23)	(0.11)	(0.21)
n	3,000	3,000	3,000	3,000

Omitted category in Models OL1 and OL2 is no secondary.
Omitted category in Models OL3 and OL4 is medium efficacy.

In Table 10 we re-estimate models 1-6 from Table 1 from the main text and models 1-8 from Table 4 in the appendix using only respondents who claim to have "heard about" the electoral reforms.

Table 10: OLS regression for perceived effect of Hungarian electoral reforms on the legitmacy of the 2014 election, pre-election survey using only respondents who claim to have heard of the reforms.

	1	2	3	4	5	6
Info	−0.07	−0.08	−0.02	−0.03	−0.43*	−0.44*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.18)	(0.18)
× non-supporter					0.47*	0.47*
					(0.19)	(0.19)
× convert					0.46*	0.43*
					(0.26)	(0.26)
× partisan					0.37*	0.39*
					(0.21)	(0.20)
Info+Partisan Cue	−0.19*	−0.20*	−0.13*	−0.14*	−0.50*	−0.53*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.18)	(0.17)
× non-supporter					0.37*	0.39*
					(0.19)	(0.18)
× convert					0.56*	0.60*
					(0.27)	(0.27)
× partisan					0.45*	0.47*
					(0.20)	(0.20)
Fidesz non-supporter			−0.56*	−0.55*	−0.84*	−0.83*
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Fidesz convert			1.05*	0.98*	0.72*	0.66*
			(0.11)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.18)
Fidesz partisan			1.45*	1.49*	1.18*	1.21*
			(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.14)
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
adj. R^2	0.00	0.02	0.40	0.42	0.40	0.42

Omitted category is Fidesz defector. $n = 2676$.

Standard errors in parentheses. Intercept estimated but not reported.

Covariates are age and its square, gender, income, region, and turnout intention

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$ (one-tailed test)

Table 11: OLS regression for perceived effect of Hungarian electoral reforms on the legitmacy of the 2014 election, pre-election survey using only respondents who claim to have heard of the reforms. Heterogeneous effects by education and efficacy.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8
Info	−0.07	−0.08	0.58*	0.54*	−0.08	−0.08	−0.002	0.001
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.116)	(0.116)
× secondary			−0.78*	−0.74*				
			(0.20)	(0.20)				
× university			−0.73*	−0.68*				
			(0.20)	(0.20)				
× low efficacy							−0.08	−0.10
							(0.16)	(0.16)
× high efficacy							−0.13	−0.13
							(0.16)	(0.16)
Info+Partisan Cue	−0.19*	−0.20*	−0.08	−0.10	−0.20*	−0.20*	−0.32*	−0.31*
	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.17)	(0.17)	(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.12)	(0.12)
× secondary			−0.17	−0.15				
			(0.20)	(0.20)				
× university			−0.08	−0.06				
			(0.20)	(0.20)				
× low efficacy							0.10	0.09
							(0.16)	(0.16)
× high efficacy							0.27*	0.24
							(0.16)	(0.16)
Secondary degree	−0.24*	−0.28*	0.07	0.02				
	(0.08)	(0.08)	(0.14)	(0.14)				
University degree	−0.37*	−0.37*	−0.09	−0.12				
	(0.08)	(0.09)	(0.14)	(0.14)				
Low efficacy					−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
					(0.06)	(0.06)	(0.11)	(0.11)
High efficacy					−0.50*	−0.44*	−0.54*	−0.47*
					(0.07)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.11)
Covariates	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
adj. R^2	0.01	0.03	0.02	0.03	0.03	0.04	0.03	0.04

Omitted category is no secondary school in Models 1-4 and medium efficacy for Models 5-8. $n = 2676$.

Standard errors in parentheses. Intercept estimated but not reported.

Covariates are age and its square, gender, income, region, and turnout intention

* indicates significance at $p < 0.05$ (one-tailed test)

E   Randomization inference

We test a series of sharp null hypotheses specified in the pre-analysis plan for effects at the individual level within a randomization inference framework. All tests use the difference-in-means statistic and report a one-sided p-value, unless otherwise noted, with 10,000 simulated random assignments using actual probabilities of assignment to each treatment condition and control. For example, for the effect of the *information* treatment as compared with control for the entire sample, we test the sharp null hypothesis $H_0 : Y_i^1(D_i = 1) = Y_i^1(D_i = 0), \forall i$, against the alternative $H_1 : Y_i^1(D_i = 1) > Y_i^1(D_i = 0), \forall i$. In this section, a Fidesz supporter is a respondent who intended to vote for Fidesz in 2014 and a non-supporter is respondent who intended to vote otherwise.

Table 12: Randomization inference tests

Hypothesis		p-value
Overall effects on perceived legitimacy:		
1a	The *information* treatment causes respondents to report that the reforms will negatively affect the fairness and legitimacy of the election. $H_0 : Y_i^1(D_i = 1) = Y_i^1(D_i = 0), \forall i$, against the alternative $H_1 : Y_i^1(D_i = 1) > Y_i^1(D_i = 0), \forall i$.	$p = 0.16$
1b	The *information+partisan cue* treatment causes respondents to report that the reforms will negatively affect the fairness and legitimacy of the election. $H_0 : Y_i^1(D_i = 2) = Y_i^1(D_i = 0), \forall i$, against the alternative $H_1 : Y_i^1(D_i = 2) > Y_i^1(D_i = 0), \forall i$.	$p = 0.002$
1c	The effects of the *information* and *information+partisan cue* treatments are not the same. $H_0 : Y_i^1(D_i = 1) = Y_i^1(D_i = 2), \forall i$, against the alternative $H_1 : Y_i^1(D_i = 1) \neq Y_i^1(D_i = 2), \forall i$.	two-sided $p = 0.06$
For non-supporters of Fidesz:		
3b	For non-supporters of Fidesz, the *information+partisan cue* treatment has a greater effect than the *information* treatment. We test the sharp null $H_0 : Y_i^1(D_i = 2\|F_i = 0) - Y_i^1(D_i = 0\|F_i = 0) = Y_i^1(D_i = 1\|F_i = 0) - Y_i^1(D_i = 0\|F_i = 0), \forall i$, against the alternative $H_1 : Y_i^1(D_i = 2\|F_i = 0) - Y_i^1(D_i = 0\|F_i = 0) > Y_i^1(D_i = 1\|F_i = 0) - Y_i^1(D_i = 0\|F_i = 0), \forall i$.	$p = 0.01$
Overall effects on satisfaction with democracy:		
4a	The *information* treatment reduces satisfaction with the way democracy works in Hungary. $H_0 : Y_i^2(D_i = 1) = Y_i^2(D_i = 0), \forall i$, against the alternative $H_1 : Y_i^2(D_i = 1) > Y_i^2(D_i = 0), \forall i$.	$p = 0.14$
4b	The *information+partisan cue* treatment reduces satisfaction with the way democracy works in Hungary. $H_0 : Y_i^2(D_i = 2) = Y_i^2(D_i = 0), \forall i$, against the alternative $H_1 : Y_i^2(D_i = 2) > Y_i^2(D_i = 0), \forall i$.	$p = 0.03$

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	Hypothesis	p-value
4c	The effects of the *information* and *information+partisan cue* treatments are not the same. $H_0 : Y_i^2(D_i = 1) = Y_i^2(D_i = 2), \forall i$, against the alternative $H_1 : Y_i^2(D_i = 1) \neq Y_i^2(D_i = 2), \forall i$.	two-sided $p = 0.36$

For non-supporters of Fidesz:

6b	For non-supporters of Fidesz, the *information+partisan cue* treatment has a greater negative effect than the *information* treatment on satisfaction with democracy. We test the sharp null $H_0 : Y_i^2(D_i = 2|F_i = 0) = Y_i^2(D_i = 1|F_i = 0), \forall i$, against the alternative $H_1 : Y_i^2(D_i = 2|F_i = 0) > Y_i^2(D_i = 1|F_i = 0), \forall i$.	$p = 0.07$

Pre- to post-election change in perceived electoral legitimacy:

7a	The *information+consequences* treatment causes respondents to report more negatively on the impact of the reforms on the fairness and legitimacy of the election as compared with before the election. $H_0 : (Y_i^{post1} - Y_i^{pre1}|D_i = 1) = (Y_i^{post1} - Y_i^{pre1}|D_i = 0), \forall i$, against the alternative $H_1 : (Y_i^{post1} - Y_i^{pre1}|D_i = 1) < (Y_i^{post1} - Y_i^{pre1}|D_i = 0), \forall i$.	$p = 0.33$
7b	The *information+consequences+partisan cue* treatment causes respondents to report more negatively on the impact of the reforms on the fairness and legitimacy of the election as compared with before the election. $H_0 : (Y_i^{post1} - Y_i^{pre1}|D_i = 2) = (Y_i^{post1} - Y_i^{pre1}|D_i = 0), \forall i$, against the alternative $H_1 : (Y_i^{post1} - Y_i^{pre1}|D_i = 2) < (Y_i^{post1} - Y_i^{pre1}|D_i = 0), \forall i$.	$p = 0.15$
7c	The effects of the *information+consequences* and *information+ consequences+partisan cue* treatments are not the same. $H_0 : (Y_i^{post1} - Y_i^{pre1}|D_i = 2) = (Y_i^{post1} - Y_i^{pre1}|D_i = 1), \forall i$, against the alternative $H_1 : (Y_i^{post1} - Y_i^{pre1}|D_i = 2) \neq (Y_i^{post1} - Y_i^{pre1}|D_i = 1), \forall i$.	two-sided $p = 0.45$